With the ascent of King Salman to power, Saudi Arabia has played an increasing role in Middle Eastern politics by flexing its muscles as a regional power. An excellent example of this is the Saudi military intervention in Yemen and its most recent threat to invade Syria under the pretense of fighting ISIL. King Salman's decision to increase Saudi Arabia's role within the region is, of course, done unilaterally and without much input from the people. Despite being an ally of the U.S., it's worth mentioning that the Saudi regime is just as undemocratic and oppressive as that of Mr. Assad's pre-war Syria of 2010.
In an analysis conducted by the Freedom House for the year 2016, Saudi Arabia is considered “Not Free,” with an aggregate score of 10, a freedom rating of 7.0, as well as a 7.0 for both civil and political liberties.
Oddly enough, it would seem that Saudi Arabia has been edging towards a slightly more free and democratic government in recent years. This is particularly visible in women's inclusion in Saudi public life as well new legislation granting increased protection of migrant workers' rights. How, then, could a country that is supposedly making such strides still receive such abysmal ratings?
In a bid to answer this question I've analyzed the recent reform measures taken by the Saudi government and have come to the conclusion that the late King Abdullah and the current King Salman have been following a strategy of what I call “superficial democratization.” This strategy is implemented on both a micro and a macro level. On the micro level, the strategy of superficial democratization is found in the royal ratification of placatory measures that are only intended to look good on paper. These measures either carry little actual significance or lack clear mechanisms for implementation. By making these small concessions, the regime hopes to ease domestic pressures from within that chafe at living in an unfree society. Saudi Arabia's superficial democratization strategy on the macro level aims to ease international pressures by using the recent democratic reforms as a veil to distract from the regime's grasp on things such as political dissidence and social media.
To further explore this, I have two particular examples in mind. The first example deals with migrant rights. In 2014, the Ministry of Labor ruled that expatriate workers who are not paid their salaries for more than three consecutive months have the right to switch their work sponsors without approval. To further fortify the law, several amendments went into effect during October 2015, and broadened the rights and protections given to the workers. However, implementation remained unclear and these laws only applied to foreign workers, thus excluding domestic workers. Thus, while officially the workers retain the rights to switch unfair and abusive sponsors, the actual practice of doing so remains unclear. Workers are still subject to abuses and the status quo is still preserved under the mask of reform.
We see a similar situation in this second example regarding women. Things seemed to be moving in a positive direction for women's involvement in Saudi public life when Norah al-Fayez was appointed as deputy minister of education. However, should be noted this appointment doesn’t necessarily improve women’s position all that much within Saudi society, Sex segregation is still very much so enforced, and provides a significant roadblock in women's full participation in the political sphere. The status quo for women is still preserved more or less, as al-Fayze's recent appoint hasn't changed the facts that women cannot drive, work within the legal system, or obtain degrees that are not taught within women's colleges.
Political rights within Saudi Arabia are lacking when compared to other countries such as Turkey. There are few venues for the citizens of the Kingdom to exercise their political will, with most of the power being concentrated in the both the King’s and ministers’ hands. In municipal elections held in December 2015, women were finally able to both vote and stand as candidates for the first time as per a 2011 royal decree. Two-thirds of the seats on the 284 councils were open to voting, while the minister retained responsibility of filling the remaining one-third of the seats via appointment. Despite the opportunity for women to obtain political power, women only won approximately one percent of contested seats.
In regards to political participation and pluralism, it should be noted that political parties are forbidden. Political opposition to the King exists only outside of the country’s borders. Criticizing the King and the Saudi state is a criminal act, and dissidents are dealt with quite harshly. The case of Raef Badawi is an excellent example of just how grave an offense it is to voice political dissent in Saudi Arabia. Badawi, a human rights activist, was imprisoned in 2015 on the charges of insulting Islam and given a sentence that mandated he serve 10 years in prison in addition to receiving 1,000 lashes.
Not only does the Saudi government tightly control dissent, but it also practices a high level of censorship. A 2011 law criminalized the criticism of the country's grand mufti, the council of Senior Religious Scholars, or government officials in a bid to stifle dissent on social media. The regime also has tried to limit the influence of new media by blocking more than 400,000 websites that were deemed immoral or politically sensitive.
Religious freedom within Saudi Arabia is also lacking. The government prohibits the public practice of any religion other than Islam, and restricts the religious practices of the Shiite and Sufi minority sects, with the construction of Shiite mosques being illegal. Additionally, the government does a poor job of respecting non-Muslim rights to worship despite those rights being officially protected. As one might imagine, churches and synagogues aren't particularly easy to find.
King Salman would much rather have his critics win a minor battle than a major war when it comes to the conversation of freedom and human rights. The government allows minor concessions to both the female and migrant worker segments of the population in an attempt to placate inner and outer criticisms. Through the use of superficial democratization, the Saudi regime takes the outward appearance of a softening monarchy while still maintaining a death-grip on basic freedoms. Succinctly put, the government loosens the noose with one hand tightens it with the other. Thus, we can see that Freedom House is entirely justified in giving Saudi Arabia its current rating due to the lack of substance behind the recent reforms. Further democratization of Saudi Arabia will only be able to occur if the Saudi youth come together as one contingent and force King Salman to implement democratic reforms that are of actual substance. Whether or not the Saudi youth will actually unite in opposition to the King's autocracy is another question entirely.
