Introduction

The phrase “radical Islamic terrorism” dominates the lexicons of many prominent policy makers. Such language forces Americans to view terrorism as a tactic employed exclusively by Muslim extremists. However, an analysis of radical Zionist groups illustrates how the roots of modern terror extend well beyond the religion of Islam. Between 1929 and 1948, Jewish insurgency groups pioneered the development of a tactic that would forever change how non-state actors combat the superior military force of a hegemon.

The Development of Terror in Palestine

One of the essential aspects of terrorism is the use of violence against civilians or property in an effort to destabilize a region. The resulting instability leaves the hegemon with two options: capitulate to the demands of the non-state actor, or expend resources and man power to restore order and prevent future unrest. If the hegemon chooses the first option, the non-state actor becomes emboldened and will make repeated attempts to use violence to shape the policy decisions of the hegemon. If the hegemon chooses the second option, it avoids setting a precedent of capitulation but risks expending vast amounts of resources in a protracted war of attrition with the non-state actor. In Palestine, the Arabs demonstrated the validity of the above statement through incitement of civil unrest. However it was the Jewish extremist groups that pioneered the systematic targeting of government symbols that is associated with modern terrorism.

In 1929, Arab uprisings in Palestine erupted over a Jewish protest which claimed that the Western Wall in Jerusalem belonged exclusively to the Jewish people. After Britain finally managed to restore order 11 months later, the uprisings had claimed the lives of over 133 Jews (Hoffman 33). In the aftermath of the uprisings, the British called for an investigation into the handling of the incident. The report produced by the Shaw commission recommended that the British emphasize their support for the rights of non-Jewish residents of Palestine. Furthermore, the report urged the British government to consider revising the Jewish immigration quota system. In essence, the Arabs had exacted concessions from the British by creating unrest in Palestine.

The lessons of the 1929 uprisings were not forgotten. In 1936, tensions between the British government and Palestinian Arabs coupled with a growing sense of Arab nationalism led to the outbreak of the Arab Rebellion. The rebellion’s violence combined with the economic damage caused by an Arab labor strike in Palestine forced the British to take action. Initially, Sir Arthur Wauchope (High Commissioner of Palestine) elected to take a more conciliatory approach towards resolving the conflict. However, it became clear that the British would have to take a more aggressive approach to subdue the rebellion. Wauchope eventually authorized the destruction of Arab homes and businesses within the city of Jaffa that were identified as rebel strongholds (Hoffman 53). On October 11, after the British had deployed nearly 20,000 troops to the region, the Rebellion finally ended. While the Arabs had failed to force the British into lowering the Jewish immigration quota, they had shown how continued unrest required the British to deploy an unsustainable amount of manpower and resources in order to end the rebellion.

The Arab uprisings in 1929 and 1936 had illustrated the effectiveness of using violence as a means of controlling a hegemon’s policy decisions. However, the rebellions were inherently inefficient and hard to control due to the large number of people involved in the uprisings. Thus, given the fact that the Yishuv (Jewish Settlers) were not eager to start a wide spread revolt for independence from the British, extremist organizations such as Irgun and Lehi were forced to create a tactic that would allow the groups to create extreme instability with a small, but highly disciplined fighting force. In essence, Irgun and Lehi developed the foundation of modern day terrorism. According to Menachem Begin (Former Irgun Commander and Israeli Prime Minister), “History and our observation persuaded us that if we could succeed in destroying the government’s prestige in Eretz Israel, the removal of its rule would follow automatically.” (Begin 52). In order to make Begin’s vision a reality, Irgun and Lehi began aggressively targeting government buildings, railroads, and petroleum production facilities (Charters 6). Between 1945 and 1947, over 1000 casualties resulted from 286 terrorist attacks conducted by Irgun and Lehi. The most famous attack occurred on 26 July 1946 when members of Irgun successfully bombed the British Headquarters at the King David Hotel. The attack killed 92 people including several British civil service workers and junior grade officers (Charters 6).

The symbolic effects of the attack extended far beyond the fact that 92 British citizens were killed. The fact that one of the most important institutions for Britain’s power projection in Palestine was successfully attacked by an insurgency group illustrated the overall deterioration of British rule in Palestine and thus substantial progress towards Begin’s stated objective of removing the British from Palestine.

Assessing the Effectiveness of Jewish Terrorism in Palestine

A cursory analysis of Jewish terrorism in Palestine would suggest that both Irgun and Lehi’s actions in the region should be considered effective given the fact that Israel became independent from British rule in 1948. However, the mere existence of a Jewish state does not vindicate the actions of Lehi and Irgun by itself. Britain was not opposed to an independent Jewish homeland. Evidence of this can be seen as early as 1917 when Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour formally announced British support for a Jewish homeland in what became known as the Balfour declaration. Furthermore, Winston Churchill reaffirmed British commitment to a Jewish homeland in 1922 while serving as Colonial Secretary (Hoffman 20). Because the British were supportive of an independent Jewish homeland, it was highly likely that an independent Jewish state would have been created without the actions of Lehi and Irgun. However, the uncontainable instability created by these insurgency groups likely expedited the formation of Israel. After the Second World War, the British economy faced an enormous amount of national debt coupled with looming concerns of a potential inflation crisis. Alfred Keynes characterized the situation as a “Financial Dunkirk” (Strange 261). Britain’s financial situation had substantial impacts on its ability to maintain order in Palestine. In addition to a lack of funding, the British military also suffered from a severe shortage of manpower due to losses from the Second World War.Continued attacks from both Irgun and Lehi placed incredible strain on Britain’s struggling military. Towards the end of British governance in Palestine, the military simply lacked the manpower and resources necessary to regain control of the region. Thus, Irgun and Lehi’ war of attrition proved to be unsustainable for the British and ultimately helped expedite the formation of a Jewish state.

Parallels to Modern Terror Groups

Both Irgun and Lehi were strikingly similar to many of today’s insurgency groups. At the tactical level, Irgun and Lehi pioneered several of the tactics employed by non-state actors in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, during the height of the campaign against the British, both Irgun and Lehi needed to develop an efficient tactic to disrupt British supply lines. The groups’ solution was to plant automatically detonated devices along roadsides used by British conveys. According to members of the groups, the devices were extremely cheap, efficient, and effective (Charters 11). Today, non-state actors in Iraq and Afghanistan employ similar tactics against US troops with devastating results.At the organizational level, Jewish insurgent groups exhibited similar patterns of behavior as the Taliban in Afghanistan: both were extremely vulnerable to fracture within the chain of command. In fact, Irgun formed when several high ranking officers within the underground defense organization Hagenah splintered from the group. Later, leaders within Irgun would again break away and form Lehi. When combating the Taliban, the United States noticed that Taliban factions were also highly vulnerable to internal fracture. To the United States’ credit, it was able to perpetuate fracture within the Taliban groups thus reducing their effectiveness on the battlefield.

Conclusions

Terrorism is not unique to a specific ideology. Rather, it is a tool that can be skillfully employed by a non-state actor to gain leverage over a hegemon. By ignoring the political and cultural undercurrents that surround terrorism and focusing on the tactic’s true origins, those who must combat the tactic will enjoy much greater success.